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Abstract
We discuss network neutrality regulation of the Internet in the context of a two-sided
market model. Platforms sell broadband Internet access services to residential consumers
and may set fees to content and application providers on the Internet. When access is mo-
nopolized, cross-group externalities (network effects) can give a rationale for network neu-
trality regulation (requiring zero fees to content providers): there exist parameter ranges for
which network neutrality regulation increases the total surplus compared to the fully pri-
vate optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content providers.
However, for other parameter values, network neutrality regulation can decrease total sur-
plus. Extending the model to a duopoly of residential broadband ISPs, we again ﬁnd
parameter values such that network neutrality regulation increases total surplus suggest-
ing that network neutrality regulation could be warranted even when some competition is
present.
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11 Introduction
The Internet is the primary global network for digital communications. A number of differ-
ent services are provided on the Internet, including e-mail, browsing, peer-to-peer services,
Internet telephony (Voice over Internet Protocol “VOIP”), and many others. A number of dif-
ferent functions/applications run on top of the Internet browser, including information services,
display of images, transmission of video and other features.
Since the inception of the Internet, information packets are transported on the Internet under
“network neutrality.” This is a regime that does not distinguish in terms of price between bits or
packets depending on the services for which these bits and packets are used or on the identities
of the uploader and downloader. The typical contract of an Internet service provider (ISP)
with a customer gives the customer access to the whole Internet through a physical or virtual
pipe of a certain bandwidth. Similarly, an ISP buys from an Internet backbone network access
to the whole Internet through a physical or virtual pipe of a certain bandwidth in a service
called “transit.” “Transit” delivers access to the buyer to the whole Internet and therefore the
buyer/ISP does not need to have any contractual relationship with any other ISP except its
backbone provider.1
The price a customer pays to an ISP for Internet access depends crucially on the availability
of competing ISPs for this customer. Customers that are not locationally constrained and can
connect to the Internet at many locations can negotiate very small connection charges. Con-
tent/applications providers are typically not locationally constrained and have negotiated very
small Internet access charges. In contrast, residential customers typically face a local monopoly
or duopoly and have much higher charges.
As search services, video services and digital distribution of content over the Internet are
growing, Internet broadband access providers AT&T, Verizon and a number of cable TV com-
panies have recently demanded additional compensation for carrying valuable digital services.
Ed Whitacre, AT&T’s then CEO, was quoted in BusinessWeek referring to AT&T’s Internet
infrastructure: “Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let
them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.”2 However,
no one is using the Internet for free. In a transmission of an information packet the ISPs on
1ISPs can also accept payment in kind, that is, barter, called ‘peering.’ Peering is a restricted service whereby
two interconnecting networks agree not pay each other for carrying the trafﬁc exchanged between them as long as
the trafﬁc originates and terminates in the two networks. For a more detailed description, see Economides (2005,
2007).
2Interview with Ed Whitacre, BusinessWeek November 7, 2005. Q: How concerned are you about Internet
upstarts like Google (GOOG), MSN, Vonage, and others? A: How do you think they’re going to get to customers?
Through a broadband pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use
my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return
on it. So there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion
they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we
and the cable companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! (YHOO) or Vonage or anybody to
expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts!
2both sides pay the Internet backbone and each ISP is paid by its customer.3 AT&T, together
with Verizon and cable TV companies, are asking for the abolition of “network neutrality.”
Intermsofpricing, thiswouldimplythatcontentandapplicationproviders(suchasGoogle,
Yahoo, MSN, or Disney) would be forced to pay the a residential consumers’ Internet service
provider to ensure that the consumer can access their services. The Internet service providers
have also expressed a desire to be able to apply different prices to different content providers,
even for the same type of information transmitted to consumers. This would imply that a
residential ISP could potentially charge Google more for making the Google search service
available to consumers than what it charges Microsoft for making its search service available.
In abolishing network neutrality, telephone and cable companies are departing from the
“end-to-end principle” that has governed the Internet since its inception.4 Under the end-to-end
principle, computers attached to the Internet that are sending and receiving information packets
did not need to know the structure of the network and could just interact end-to-end. Thus, there
could be innovation “at the edge” of the network without interference from network operators.5
The way the Internet has operated so far is a radical departure from the operating principles
of the traditional digital electronic networks predating it, such as Compuserve, Prodigy, AOL,
AT&T Mail, MCI Mail and others. These older electronic networks were centralized with very
little functionality allowed at the edge of the network.
From an economics point of view, the departure from network neutrality regulation will
have two primary consequences.
 It will introduce the potential of two-sided pricing on the Internet where a transmission
company controlling some part of the Internet (here last mile access) will charge a fee to
content or application ﬁrms “on the other side” of the network which typically did not
haveacontractualrelationshipwithit. Thispaymentbyacontentorapplicationsprovider
would be over and above the traditional one-sided payment to its ISP for providing access
and transmission of information packets.
 It will introduce the possibility for prioritization, which may enhance the arrival time of
information packets originating from paying content and application ﬁrms “on the other
side,” and may degrade the arrival time of information packets that originate from non-
paying ﬁrms. This has the possibility of increasing efﬁciency of packet transfers over the
Internet, such that more time-sensitive packets are given prioritized access. But it can
also effectively exclude access to non-paying ﬁrms’ content and applications.
In this paper, we deal with the issue of introducing two-sided market pricing by formally build-
ing a model of a two-sided market. We thus only concentrate on the issue of one-sided versus
two-sided pricing (which we think should play a larger role in the debate) and ignore other
3See Economides (2005, 2007).
4For more on the end-to-end argument, see e.g. Saltzer, Reed and Clark (1984).
5See Cerf (2006a,b) for a detailed explanation of this argument.
3Figure 1: We take the Internet backbone and ISPs on the side of content providers as com-
petitive and consider the price for Internet access that residential consumers pay and possible
direct fees imposed on content providers by residential ISPs. The latter are possible if network
neutrality is abolished and an ISP can determine the origins of packets it delivers to consumers.
(admittedly important) issues such as exclusion of content providers, dynamic investment in-
centives and price discrimination. In particular, we abstract entirely from prioritization issues
in order to focus on two-sided pricing.
We explicitly model the Internet broadband market as a two-sided network consisting of
broadband users on one side and content and applications providers on the other. Prices im-
posed on both sides have direct implications on the number of broadband consumers as well as
on the number of active providers of content and applications. In our framework, network neu-
trality is deﬁned as the restriction that Internet Service providers cannot directly charge content
providers for access to consumers, i.e., the price on one side of the market is constrained to
zero. We only consider direct charges to content providers over and above charges for sending
and receiving trafﬁc from the Internet backbone. Figure 1 shows the conceptual structure of the
Internet connecting consumers and content providers.6
Our setup is based on the standard two-sided market model of Armstrong (2006). We
discuss the desirability of departing from network neutrality to allow the residential ISP to
initiate a positive fee to the content and applications side of the market, besides the price it
charges to users/subscribers. Our main point is that cross-group externalities (network effects)
between consumers and content providers can provide a rationale for network neutrality regu-
lation: for some parameter values, preventing residential ISPs from charging content providers
for making their services available to residential consumers increases the total social surplus.
However, there also exist parameter values for which this result is overturned. Therefore, ulti-
mately whether network neutrality regulation is desirable or not is ambiguous in a monopoly
ISP setting. We then extend the model to a duopoly ISP setting with multi-homing content
providers and single-homing consumers and show that imposing network neutrality weakly in-
creases total surplus (given that the market on the consumer side is fully covered). We show
that, when the market is fully covered (so everyone has Internet access), network neutrality will
always increase total surplus if content providers value consumers more than consumers value
content providers. The reason for the unambiguous increase is the surplus loss arising when
some content providers exit when positive fees are imposed on them. If we additionally allow
6Of course, to be able to charge some providers and not others requires that the residential ISP inspects packets
to determine whether they originate from a paying ﬁrm.
4for demand expansion effects on the consumer side, there are again parameter values for which
network neutrality increases total surplus but in general network neutrality can both increase or
decrease total surplus.
Despite a considerable literature discussing the rights and legal issues of network neutrality
and its abolition, the literature on economic analysis of this issue is thin (Schuett (2010) pro-
vides a survey). In a paper relating to the establishment of multiple “lanes” or quality options
for application providers, Hermalin and Katz (2007) analyze a model where network neutrality
is equivalent to a single product quality requirement.7 Focusing on congestion, Cheng, Bandy-
opadhyay and Guo (2011) model two content providers who can avoid congestion by paying
ISPs for preferential access.8 They ﬁnd that abolishing network neutrality will beneﬁt ISPs
and hurt content providers. Choi and Kim (2010) study both a static and a dynamic setting fo-
cusing on how innovation incentives are affected by network neutrality. They ﬁnd ambiguous
results regarding the impact of network neutrality regulation on welfare, but highlight that, in
a dynamic setting, network neutrality regulation affects the incentives of the network opera-
tor by either allowing the network operator to charge more/less for access or by allowing the
network operator to sell rights to prioritized delivery of content.9 Economides and Hermalin
(2010), despite assuming network congestion, ﬁnd that network neutrality is welfare-superior
to bandwidth subdivision and prioritization for a wide class of utility functions, and character-
ize exceptional cases where prioritization is desirable. They also ﬁnd that the incentive to invest
in bandwidth is greater when the ISPs can price discriminate, and investment in bandwidth may
mitigate or even reverse the welfare losses of departures from network neutrality. A paper sim-
ilar in spirit to Economides and Hermalin (2010) is Krämer and Wiewiorra (2010). It studies
a two-sided monopoly market model focusing on congestion and prioritization of access with
content providers vertically differentiated and homogeneous consumers. In that model, net-
7Hermalin and Katz (2007) do not address the issue of the reduction of the “standard” lane for Internet access
that is likely to reduce consumers’ welfare. They do consider a two-sided market model, but their model does not
have positive cross group externalities.
8See also Jamison and Hauge (2008).
9In addition, Chen and Nalebuff (2007) analyze competition between complements and brieﬂy touch upon the
issue of network neutrality. Some services that are offered by an ISP may also be offered over the Internet (such as
Vonage or Skype). There is a concern that the ISP would like to disrupt the quality of the services of its competitors
to further its own product. However, the authors show that this would not be proﬁt maximizing in their model since
a monopolist ISP beneﬁts from valuable complements such as VOIP services (a higher price for internet access
could be charged instead of trying to force consumers to its own VOIP service). Hogendorn (2007) analyzes
the differences between open access and network neutrality and emphasizes that these are different policies that
may have different implications. Hogendorn interprets network neutrality in a slightly different way than most
of the literature. Open access refers to allowing intermediaries access to conduits (so that intermediaries such
as Yahoo can access conduits like AT&T at a nondiscriminatory price), while network neutrality is interpreted to
mean that content providers have unrestricted access to intermediaries (so that Yahoo cannot restrict which content
providers can be reached through its portal). Under network neutrality, a smaller number of intermediaries enter
the market due to decreased proﬁts. Open access, on the other hand, increases the entry of intermediaries since
they now have free access to conduits. In general, Hogendorn ﬁnds that open access is not a substitute for network
neutrality regulation. Finally, Economides (2008) discusses several possible price discrimination strategies that
may become available if network neutrality is abolished. He presents a brief model showing that the total surplus
may be lower when the platform imposes a positive fee on an application developed for it because the fee raises
the marginal cost of the application and hence also its price.
5work neutrality means that the ISP cannot build a “fast-lane” that would, at a price, provide
prioritized access over best-effort delivery. Musacchio, Schwartz and Walrand (2009) study
the interaction between many content providers and many ISPs connecting content providers
to consumers. The content providers derive proﬁts from advertising revenues arising from con-
sumer clicks.
In contrast to the above literature, we focus purely on the issue of two-sided pricing made
possible by the violation network neutrality and the interaction between the two sides gener-
ated by cross-group externalities heterogeneity among both consumers and content providers.
Hence, our paper is related to the literature on two-sided markets (e.g. Armstrong (2006),
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Hagiu (2009), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Nocke, Peitz and
Stahl (2007) and Weyl (2010)). In particular, we build on the approach in Armstrong (2006)
by extending it to study network neutrality regulation, and by studying optimal regulation of
one price in a two-sided market while the platforms are allowed to optimally set the other price
in response. Related is also Hagiu (2007) who discusses open versus proprietary platforms,
where open platforms imply zero prices on each side of the market. In contrast, we allow one
price to be positive while the other is constrained to zero under network neutrality regulation.
A central result in Hagiu (2007) is that a monopoly proprietary platform can sometimes be
welfare superior to an open platform because pricing by the platform partially internalizes ex-
ternalities across the two sides. In our setting, however, the result is that limiting the pricing
behavior of proprietary platforms (the ISPs) can sometimes be welfare superior. Furthermore,
in contrast to Hagiu (2007), we also study a duopoly setting and show that with a fully covered
market, restricting pricing behavior of duopolist platforms is unambiguously welfare superior
to allowing two-sided pricing.
We have structured our paper in the following way. We ﬁrst present and evaluate the impact
of network neutrality regulation in a monopoly model in section 2. In section 3, we extend
the monopoly model to a duopoly setting with multi-homing content providers. Concluding
remarks are given in section 4.
2 Platform Monopoly
We start with a platform monopoly model of a two-sided market. A platform (say, a telephone
company such as AT&T) sells broadband Internet access to residential consumers at a subscrip-
tion price p and possibly collects a fee s from each content or application provider to allow the
content to reach the consumer. We assume that the platform monopolist (and later in the paper,
duopolists) only offers linear fee contracts, i.e., it does not offer quantity discounts and does
not offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts with lump-sum fees.10 Furthermore, we abstract from the
10One could alternatively view our setup also as only considering consumer and content provider use of a high
speed dedicated last mile access line offered to content providers requiring a high level of quality of service to
ensure that, for example, HD video transmissions work well.
6full complexity of the Internet, which consists of many interconnected networks and assume
that the networks that lie between the access provider and the content provider are passive
(see Figure 1).11 Finally, we assume that the cost of providing the platform service is c per
consumer.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers are interested in accessing the Internet to reach search engines (e.g. Google), online
stores (e.g. Amazon), online auctions (e.g. eBay) and online video, audio, still pictures, and
other content. A consumer i’s location (type) xi indexes his/her utility for accessing the Internet
through the ISP and interacting with the content providers. Consumers pay a transportation
cost equal to t per unit of distance “traveled.” Consumers’ locations are uniformly distributed
on the interval zero to one with the platform located at x = 0. This speciﬁcation allows for
an easy extension to a duopoly setting. For our interpretation of consumer heterogeneity to be
consistent with both the monopoly and duopoly models, one should view the monopoly model
as a model of “horizontal differentiation with a missing ISP.” Consumers with a high x would
have liked to purchase access from the missing ISP but, in its absence, stay out of the market.
This modeling setup is a common way in the literature to model competition. It is also con-
sistent with Armstrong (2006), who uses a similar setup to go from a monopoly to a duopoly
model. A typical interpretation of heterogeneity is that consumers have preferences over two
ISPs, say AT&T and Comcast, as a result of branding and/or prior experience with the compa-
nies. This makes competition between the ISPs imperfect and it is this notion that our model
is designed to capture. Moreover, there is empirical support for that consumer heterogeneity
matters in the ISP market. Chen and Savage (2011) empirically estimate a model where DSL
and Cable modem providers compete in duopoly and measure consumer heterogeneity as the
standard deviation of the population’s number of years of schooling. They ﬁnd that consumer
preference heterogeneity has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the price, consistent with a
generalized Hotelling model.
Consumer i’s utility is speciﬁed as
ui = v+bncp txi  p; (1)
where v > c is an intrinsic value that a consumer receives from connecting to the Internet
irrespective of the amount of content, b is the marginal value that a consumer places on an
additional content provider on the Internet and ncp is the number of active content providers.12
11If the in-between networks also attempted to charge a fee to content providers, there would be the possibility
of high prices because of double or multiple marginalization.
12ThebeneﬁtvarisesfromInternet-enabledservicesthatdonotcruciallydependonthenumberofotherInternet
subscribers or availability of content. An example is television services bundled with Internet access.
72.2 Content Providers
Content providers rely on advertising revenue per consumer, a, to generate revenue. We assume
contentproviderstobeuniformlydistributedontheunitintervalandhaveaunitmass. Wemake
the simplifying assumption that content providers are independent monopolists, each in its own
market, and therefore do not compete with each other. Each content provider then earns anc,
where nc is the number of consumers paying the platform for access to content providers. Thus,
a is the value for a content provider of an additional consumer connected to the Internet.
Contentprovidersareheterogeneousintermsoftheﬁxedcostsofcomingupwithabusiness
idea and setting up their business. A content provider indexed by j faces a ﬁxed cost of fyj,
where yj is the index of the content provider’s location on the unit interval.13 The marginal
costs for serving advertisements to consumers are taken to be zero. Each content provider may
have to pay the platform a lump-sum fee equal to s to gain access to users. This fee is assumed
to be the same for all content providers and it is set by the platform.14 Thus, a content provider
j’s proﬁt is
pj = anc s  fyj: (2)
Network neutrality regulation corresponds to the case where s is zero. As discussed earlier,
the traditional fees paid for transit service by content/applications providers are small, and here
we take them to be zero at the status quo network neutrality regime.15 Figure 2 shows the
interaction between consumers and content providers through the platform.
2.3 Demand
In this two-sided market, the demand for content depends on the expected amount of content
provided since more consumers will connect to the network if more expected content is avail-
able. In addition, the provision of content depends on the expected number of consumers.
When the expected number of consumers is ne
c and the expected number of content providers
is ne
cp, the marginal consumer xi who is indifferent between subscribing to the Internet not
subscribing is located at





13We assume that the “market is not covered” in the sense that some content providers will always have such
high ﬁxed costs that they decide not to enter the market. Further, we assume demand for access to consumers to
be differentiable.
14Alternatively, the fee to the platform can be speciﬁed to be proportional to the number of platform customers,
and therefore a content provider’s proﬁts are: pj = (a s)nc   fyj This results in a proﬁt for the ISP of: P =
(p c)nc +sncncp While our demand functions in the monopoly case change for a general fee s while being
identical under net neutrality regulation with s zero, our qualitative results in Proposition 1 are robust to this
alternative speciﬁcation.
15In any case, we can interpret the fee s as the increment above the traditional transit fee charged for transporting
the bits. Additionally, the consumers’ ISP is usually not the same as the content providers’ ISP.
8Figure 2: Interaction of consumers with content providers and vice versa through the platform.
The marginal content provider yj indifferent between being active and exiting the market is
located at








c = ncp. The number of consumers and active content providers is then given by the










Positivity of the demands requires ft > ab, and v to be sufﬁciently large: v > p+bs=f and
v > p+ts=a.
We now study the monopoly platform optimum, the optimum with network neutrality regu-
lation and the social optimum. Later we consider the welfare implications of imposing network
neutrality.
2.4 Monopoly Platform Optimum
Consider ﬁrst the monopoly platform private optimum under which the platform is free to set
both the subscription price p and the fee s to content providers. The platform faces the problem
of choosing p and s to maximize
P(p;s) = (p c)nc(p;s)+sncp(p;s): (7)
9Because the two markets provide complementary products, the monopolist ﬁnds an inverse
relationship between p and s; that is, maximizing with respect to p results in a smaller p when
s is larger, and maximizing with respect to s results in a smaller s when p is larger. Speciﬁcally,










To ensure that the second order conditions are fulﬁlled here and in the analysis that follows,
we assume that there is sufﬁcient differentiation among consumers and content providers, or
equivalently, that the network effects are not too strong. We also assume that the market is
never entirely covered on the consumer or the content provider side.
Assumption 1. (i) Cross-group externalities (network effects) are not too strong, or equiv-
alently, consumers and content providers are sufﬁciently differentiated: ft   (a+b)
2 > 0.
(ii) The market is never entirely covered on the consumer or the content provider side: ft  
(a+b)
2 > maxff(v c);(a+b)(v c)g:
We make the assumption strong enough to cover not only the monopolist’s maximization
problem but the social planner’s as well. Hence, the conditions in Assumption 1 come from
the second order conditions and equilibrium participation levels when determining socially op-
timal prices. The conditions for obtaining interior solutions for the privately optimal monopoly
prices are weaker, but we impose this stricter assumption here because we want to compare the
privately optimal price balance to the socially optimal price balance under the same assump-
tions.16
Solving the two above equations simultaneously gives the consumers’ subscription price







4ft  (a+b)2 : (11)
16We also focus only on interior solutions.
17The second order conditions for the monopolist’s maximization problem are  2f=(ft  ab) < 0,  2t=(ft  
ab) < 0; and 4ft (a+b)
2=(ft  ab)
2 > 0: These are satisﬁed under Assumption 1 (i). For nM
c and nM
cp to be less
than 1, it must be that 4ft  (a+b)
2 > 2f (v c) and that 4ft  (a+b)
2 > (a+b)(v c)










and the proﬁts of the monopoly platform are PM = f(v c)2=(4ft  (a+b)2).
Superscript M indicates the fully private optimum where both p and s are chosen by the
monopoly platform. The price consumers pay is above the marginal cost if 2ft  a(a+b) > 0,
which holds under Assumption 1.18 The monopoly platform service provider sets a positive fee
to content providers for accessing users (sM > 0) only if a=b > 1. This means that if content
providers value additional consumers more highly than consumers value additional content
providers, the platform will charge content providers a positive price for accessing consumers.
2.5 Monopoly Platform Pricing under Network Neutrality Regulation
Now consider the optimal choices of the monopoly platform provider under network neutrality
regulation, that is, when, by regulation, s=0. The objective of the platform is now to maximize
PNN = (p c)nc: (14)
This gives the equilibrium price pNN = (v+c)=2. Equilibrium participation levels are nNN
c =
f(v c)=(2(ft ab)) and nNN
cp = a(v c)=2(ft ab). The platform’s proﬁts are PNN = f(v 
c)2=(4ft  4ab).19
2.6 Social Optimum with a Monopoly Platform
We now solve for prices p and s that maximize the total surplus deﬁned as TS(p;s) =P(p;s)+










18More generally, although a below-cost price might not be implementable, the platform may tie other products
with the offer for Internet access and thereby, in effect, obtain a negative price (Amelio and Jullien (2007)).
19The second order condition is  2f=(ft  ab) < 0, which is satisﬁed under Assumption 1 (i). For nNN
c and
nNN
cp to be less than 1, it must be that 2(ft  ab) > 2f (v c) and that 2(ft  ab) > a(v c)
11is the total content providers’ proﬁts. Maximizing the total surplus, a planner chooses
p =
ftc b(a+b)c a(a+b)v




ft  (a+b)2 < 0: (18)
This results in maximized total surplus TS(p;s) = f(v c)2=2(ft  (a+b)2):20 The central
idea here is that due to cross-group externalities, the network effects arising from the comple-
mentarity of the content and Internet subscription market imply that the planner sets a negative
fee to content providers s < 0 and a subscription price below its marginal cost p < c to inter-
nalize the externality of content on subscribers and the externality of subscribers on content.
Note that if a=b > 1 we have that s < 0 < sM, i.e., that the unregulated monopolist sets
a positive fee whereas the social optimal fee would be negative. More generally, if we put no
restriction on a=b, the unregulated monopolist will impose a higher fee on the other side of the
market than the regulated monopolist, s < sM; when ft > a(a+b)2=(a+3b), that is, when
there is a sufﬁciently high differentiation among consumers and content providers.
2.7 Welfare Implications of Imposing Network Neutrality
In this subsection, we examine the welfare implications of imposing network neutrality by
examining the changes in welfare that occur when moving from a privately optimal p, given
s = 0, to the full private optimum (pMand sM). We will show that there exist parameter values
suchthattotalsurplusishigherundernetworkneutralityregulationthanunderanunconstrained
private optimum.
We can explicitly compare prices, equilibrium participation levels and surplus distribution
across a setting where the platform is free to set both s and p, and a setting of network neutrality
regulation where s is constrained to equal zero. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Comparing network neutrality with the choice of the monopolist platform, we
ﬁnd that for a=b > 1 : (i) total surplus is higher in network neutrality for sufﬁciently large
differentiation parameters ft and if a=b < 5, and therefore there exist parameters such that
network neutrality regulation increases total surplus; (ii) the content sector has higher proﬁts
and more content providers are active in network neutrality; and (iii) the platform and the
consumers are better off without net neutrality.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
20The second order conditions for the planner’s maximization problem are  f(ft  a2 2ab)=(ft  ab)
2 < 0,
 t(ft  b2  2ab)=(ft  ab)
2 < 0, and (ft  (a+b)
2)=(ft  ab)
2 > 0. These are satisﬁed under Assumption
1 (i): ft  (a+b)
2 > 0. For n
c and n
cp to be less than 1, it must be that ft  (a+b)
2 > f(v c)and that
ft  (a+b)
2 > (a+b)(v c).
12Part (i) of Proposition 1 offers our main insight. Cross-group externalities and two-sided
pricing could be a rationale for intervening and imposing network neutrality regulations that
restrict two-sided pricing such that the price to content providers is zero. The reason is that the
private platform does not fully internalize the cross-group externalities, and thus a restriction of
zero price on one side of the market could increase total surplus by bringing the price balance
closer to the socially optimal one. Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 are also interesting in
that the consumer surplus is higher in monopoly while total surplus can be higher at network
neutrality. The intuition is that in monopoly, consumers beneﬁt from a lower subscription
price since the monopolist has incentives to attract more consumers to generate extra revenue
from charging content providers. Although charging content providers leads to lower content
provision, the direct effect of a lower subscription price dominates. In contrast, total surplus
takes into account the proﬁts of content providers, which are higher under network neutrality.
Thus, despite consumers’ surplus and platform proﬁts being lower at network neutrality, the
total surplus is higher for this parameter range.
The relative size of the cross group externalities, a=b, is important for this result since
it determines the price balance in the market. A higher ratio implies that a content provider
values an additional consumer more than a consumer values an additional content provider,
implying that the monopolist platform charges content providers more. Outcomes where the
removal of network neutrality leads to positive prices for content providers require this ratio
to be high enough (a=b > 1). On the other hand, if it is too large, (a=b > 5), then the cross-
group externalities implies a strongly asymmetric price balance for both the social optimum
and the private optimum. Imposing a zero price on one side then leads to the price balance
deviating “too much” from the social optimum implying that total surplus decreases when
imposing network neutrality. Finally, note that for smaller ft, the total surplus may decrease
under network neutrality, as the increase in content provider proﬁts is not sufﬁciently large to
compensate for reductions in consumer surplus and platform proﬁts.
2.8 Second Best Solutions Under Regulation
In a sense, imposing network neutrality is a shortcut for optimal regulatory intervention. As
we have shown in section 2.6, a regulator who is able to choose both prices p and s will choose
both prices below cost, leading to losses for the ISP. Besides the problem that the ISP does not
break even, the regulator may not be able to set both prices, and in fact the FCC has committed
not to regulate the user price p. So, in this section we consider two second best regulatory
problems. First, we analyze the problem of optimal regulation of s, under the assumption that,
given s, the ISP will be fully unconstrained in choosing price p. We ﬁnd that then the regulator
chooses a fee below cost, but revenues from the end user side are sufﬁcient to give the ISP
positive proﬁts. Second, we analyze the problem of the regulator choosing both p and s under
a minimum proﬁt constraint. We show that for a wide range of proﬁt minimums, the regulator
13would impose a negative fee s.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1 the following holds: (i) for a=b 2 (1;3) and ft sufﬁciently
large, a total surplus maximizing planner/regulator, facing a platform monopolist that chooses
the subscription price, will choose a below-cost fee to content providers, i.e., will subsidize
content providers. Even paying the below-cost fee, the platform makes positive proﬁts; (ii) for
a=b > 1, and ft > a3=b , if the total surplus maximizing regulator is free to set both the price p
and the fee s, but is constrained to ensure a minimum proﬁt P for the platform (including a zero
minimum proﬁt), the total surplus maximizing regulator will set a negative fee if the minimum
proﬁt level is not too high (P < ˆ P, where ˆ P is deﬁned in Appendix B).
Proof. See below and Appendix B.
To see the ﬁrst part of the proposition, note ﬁrst that when the regulator chooses s expecting
the proﬁt maximizing best response of the ISP, p(s); the regulator maximizes the constrained




and the corresponding monopolist’s user price is
p =
a2(cft +b2(2c+v))+a(2bft(2c+v) 2cb3) a4v  ft(3b2c 2ft(c+v))
(a2 6ab 3b2)ft +4f2t2 a(a 2b)(a+b)2 : (20)
The fee s to content providers is negative provided that a=b < 3 and ft is sufﬁciently large.21
Given that the s is negative, the platform proﬁts from consumers more than cover the subsidy
to content providers if
(ft)2(3a2 10ab 9b2+4ft) a(a+b)(a(a+b)(a2 3ab+4b2)+(a 3b)(a+4b)ft) > 0;
(21)
which is true for a sufﬁciently large ft.22 Thus, the platform’s proﬁts are positive even when,
following the regulator’s orders, the platform imposes the negative fee s to the other side of
the market.23
21Fors <0, itissufﬁcienttohavea(a(a b)+2b2)< ft(3b a)whichisimpliedbya<3bandft sufﬁciently
large.
22The condition can be reformulated as
4(ft)3 +(3a2  10ab 9b2)(ft)2  a(a+b)(a 3b)(a+4b)ft  a(a+b)a(a+b)(a2  3ab+4b2) > 0 or
A(ft)3+B(ft)2 C(ft) D > 0 with A = 4 > 0. Hence, the expression is positive for ft sufﬁciently large.
23We have also considered the possibility that the regulator can set the price to users but allows the platform
to set a fee to content providers. In that case, the regulator maximizes TS(b p;s(b p)) by choosing b p. This leads the
regulator to choose a below-cost user price b p c =  
(a+b)(2a2b+2bft a(b2+3ft))(c v)
(2a b)b(a+b)2+( 3a2 6ab+b2)ft+4f2t2 < 0 and, in response, the
platform chooses an above-cost content-provider fee s(b p) =
f(a2b+b3 2aft)(c v)
(2a b)b(a+b)2+( 3a2 6ab+b2)ft+4f2t2 > 0.
14Next, consider the problem when the regulator can choose both prices p and s under a
minimum proﬁt constraint solving
TS(p;s) s:t: P(p;s) = P (22)
We prove Proposition 2(ii) in Appendix B. If the minimum proﬁt to be achieved is below a
speciﬁc level ˆ P and there is sufﬁcient differentiation (ft is large enough) the regulator will
impose a negative fee s. Conversely, if the minimum proﬁt level to be achieved is above ˆ P, the
regulator who is able to choose both prices will choose a positive fee s. Intuitively, the regulator
has incentives to set prices and fees lower than a monopolist platform so as to internalize cross-
group externalities across the sides. The requirement that the platform must obtain some proﬁt
level restricts how low the price and the fee can be. As long as the required minimum proﬁt
level is not too high, the regulator can set a negative fee s, but once the required proﬁt level
goes above ˆ P a positive fee is required to ensure sufﬁcient proﬁts to the ISP.
We also show in Appendix B that when the regulator is maximizing proﬁts subject to a
constraint of zero proﬁts for the ISP, he will choose an above cost price to users and a below
cost fee to applications, s < 0 < p c, for sufﬁcient differentiation (ft).
This pricing pattern is consistent with the typical case in two-sided market models, where
it is optimal (both privately and socially) to subsidize the side that brings more value to the
platform while making money off the other side. In our model, the stand-alone value that
consumers get in the absence of the network, v, and  p are perfect substitutes from the point
of view of consumers. It is as if v is already a “subsidy” to consumers, making the user side of
the market more valuable to the ISP than the content side. As long as there is sufﬁcient product
differentiation compared to network effects, the users’ side of the market is more valuable as
discussed above.24 Hence, for sufﬁcient differentiation (compared to cross-group externalities)
the regulator raises the price to consumers before the fee to content providers to ensure that the
ISP breaks even.
3 Duopoly Platforms with Multi-homing Content Providers
We now extend our model to duopoly competition between two platforms with multi-homing
content providers. We assume that consumers single-home, i.e., each consumer buys Internet
access from one platform only. Content and applications providers, however, are assumed to
multi-home, i.e., they sell through both platforms, paying the fees charged by platforms. As in
monopoly, we assume that platforms only offer linear subscription prices and content provider
fees.
24The content side of the market may become more valuable to the ISP only when differentiation is low com-
pared to the relation between cross-group network effects a and b. This occurs if the second condition in Proposi-
tion 2(ii) does not hold (if ft 6 a3=b).
153.1 Consumers
There are two platforms (1 and 2) located at x = 0 and x = 1. We assume that each platform
offers the same intrinsic beneﬁt v to consumers. Given an expected number of content providers
ne
cpk in each platform k, k 2 f1;2g, the marginal consumer, indifferent between buying from
platform 1 or 2, is located at xi that obeys
v+bne
cp1 txi  p1 = v+bne
cp2 t(1 xi)  p2: (23)











nc2 = 1 nc1: (25)
3.2 Content Providers
Content providers are deﬁned as in the monopoly model above, that is, they are heterogeneous
with respect to the ﬁxed costs of setting up shop. The expected number of consumers that are
able to reach each content provider is ne
ck, if the content provider buys access from platform k,
k 2 f1;2g. The total revenue for each content provider is ane
ck.
Platform k collects a fee sk from each content provider to allow access to its users. Thus, a
content provider j’s proﬁt from selling through platform k is
pjk = ane
ck sk  fyj: (26)
Each content provider with pjk > 0 sets up its business, pays platform k for access to its con-
sumers, and makes non-negative proﬁts from sales to those consumers. Thus, the marginal
content ﬁrm which is indifferent between being active and staying out of the market is ncpk =
(ane
ck  sk)=f with k 2 f1;2g.25 Since consumers single-home, content providers can only
reach the consumers of each platform by buying access from that platform. Essentially, as
Armstrong (2006) points out, a “competitive bottleneck” arises as there is no competition for
content providers since they make a decision to join one platform independently of the decision
to join the other. This phenomenon is common in, for example, competing mobile telecommu-
nications networks (receivers join one network but callers may call all networks) and news-
papers (a consumer may subscribe to only one newspaper but advertisers may advertise in all
newspapers).
25This implies that, for example if ncp1 <ncp2, there are some content providers that connect to both ISPs, some
that only connect to ISP2 and some that do not connect at all.
163.3 Demand
As in the monopoly setup, we look for a fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium. Each side’s ex-
pectations are fulﬁlled and therefore ne
ck = nck and ne
cpk = ncpk, k 2 f1;2g. Solving the four
equation system given by (24), (25) and ncpk = (ane
ck  sk)=f; the number of consumers and





















a(b(s1+s2)+ f(t + p1  p2)) (a2b+2fts2)
2f(ft  ab)
: (30)
We ﬁrst consider the unrestricted duopoly equilibrium, then the duopoly equilibrium under
networkneutralityregulationandﬁnallywestudythewelfareimplicationsofimposingnetwork
neutrality regulation.
3.4 Unrestricted Duopoly Equilibrium
When the duopoly platforms are free to set prices to both consumers and content providers,
platform k maximizes Pk(p1;p2;s1;s2)=(pk c)nck+skncpk; with k 2f1;2gresulting in equi-
librium prices pD
1 = pD
2 =t+c (a2+3ab)=4f and sD
1 =sD
2 =(a b)=4:26 The duopolists split
the market on the consumer side and proﬁts are PD
1 =PD
2 =(4ft (a+b)2+4(ft ab))=16f:
3.5 Duopoly under Network Neutrality Regulation
Under network neutrality regulation s1 = s2 = 0, and the duopolists independently set their
prices to consumers to maximize P1 = (p1  c)nc1 and P2 = (p2  c)nc2 with respect to p1
and p2, respectively, resulting in equilibrium prices of pDNN
1 = pDNN
2 = t +c ab=f:27 The




26The second-order conditions are  f=(ft  ab) < 0,  
(2ft ab)
f(ft ab) < 0 and
(4ft (a+b)2)+4(ft ab)
4(ab ft)2 > 0. They are
satisﬁed under Assumption 1. For ncpk < 1, we need a+b < 4f.
27The second-order condition,  f=(ft  ab) < 0, is satisﬁed under Assumption 1. For ncpk < 1, we require
a < 2f.
173.6 Welfare Implications of Imposing Network Neutrality in Duopoly
In this section, we proceed as in monopoly by making a point-to-point comparison between un-
constrained duopoly and the market equilibrium under network neutrality. As in the monopoly
model, we compare changes in price to consumers and fees to content providers when moving
from a regime with network neutrality to a regime of no regulation. We obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Comparing unconstrained duopoly with duopoly under network neutrality, we
ﬁnd that, for a=b > 1 : (i) total surplus is higher in network neutrality; and (ii), the content
sector and the platforms have higher proﬁts, but consumers are worse off under network neu-
trality.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Thus, under no regulation, competition for consumers is more intense since proﬁts from
content providers can be competed away. As a result, consumers enjoy lower prices and are
better off under no regulation than under network neutrality. Network neutrality regulation
relaxes price competition, leading to higher proﬁts for platforms. Platforms are better off under
network neutrality, which is the opposite to the case in the monopoly model.28
An important note is that we assume full market coverage on the consumer side, which im-
plies that price reductions to consumers will only lead to surplus transfers between consumers
and platforms. In contrast, on the content provider side, fee increases lead to reductions in the
surplus.
We now brieﬂy consider a version of the model where the market on the consumer side is
not covered. Let the platforms locate at a distance d < 1=2 each from the endpoints such that
ISP 1 locates at d and ISP 2 locates at 1 d. We assume that d and t are sufﬁciently large
so that the market is never covered and the platforms compete for consumers located between
them. Hence, there will be three marginal consumers denoted x1, x2 and x3. The consumer
located at x1 is indifferent between buying from platform 1 and staying out of the market. The
consumer located at x2 is indifferent between the two platforms and the consumer located at x3
is indifferent between staying out of the market and buying from platform 2. Given our utility















28Note that this runs counter to the observed behavior of ISP: they push for the removal of network neutrality.
As we show in Proposition 4, ISPs could beneﬁt from the removal of network neutrality if the market is not fully







Demand on the consumer side is nc1 = x2  x1 and nc2 = x3  x2. The content provider side
remains unchanged. We can then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition4. Comparingunconstrainedduopolywithduopolyundernetworkneutralitywhen
the consumerside is notfully covered, weﬁnd that fora=b>1: (i) totalsurplus either increases
or decreases under network neutrality; and (ii) the content sector has higher proﬁts, but the
consumers and the platforms are worse off under network neutrality.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4 shows that the effect on total surplus of imposing network neutrality regula-
tions can now either be positive or negative depending on parameter values even if a=b > 1.
Under no regulation, the competition for consumers is more intense since proﬁts from content
providers can be competed away. As a result, consumers enjoy lower prices and are better
off under no regulation than under network neutrality. Platforms are also better off under no
regulation. This is the opposite result to that of the case when the market was covered due to
proﬁts from more consumers entering the market. Content providers have higher proﬁts under
network neutrality as was the case with a covered market.
In sum, extending the monopoly model to a duopoly setup, we showed that there still ex-
ist parameter ranges for which network neutrality improves total surplus. This echoes earlier
theoretical evidence suggesting that introducing competition in a two-sided market does not
necessarily lead to a pricing structure that is closer to the socially optimal one (see, for exam-
ple, Wright (2004), Armstrong (2006) or Hagiu (2007)).
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a model of a two-sided market to assess the effects of the Internet
departing from “network neutrality” where broadband Internet access providers (telephone and
cable TV companies) do not charge a positive fee to content and application providers. We
explicitly allowed monopoly and duopoly access providers to charge a positive fee to content
and applications providers. Our main point has been that cross-group externalities between
consumers and content providers could give a rationale for network neutrality regulations since
there exist parameter ranges such that preventing ISPs from charging content providers positive
prices for access to consumers increases total surplus. We have showed that one can ﬁnd
such parameter ranges both in the monopoly model and in the duopoly model suggesting that
network neutrality regulation could be warranted even when some competition is present in the
platform market. However, the overall effect of implementing network neutrality regulations
can still be both positive and negative depending on parameter values.
19As noted in the introduction, the economics literature on network neutrality regulation is
still in its early stages. Further rigorous economic analysis is needed on issues such as the
impact of network neutrality regulation on innovation among content providers, non-linear
platform pricing and congestion and broadband penetration. In particular, the issue of price
discrimination and two-part tariffs to consumers and content providers is important. Our results
rely quite extensively on the platform not being able to appropriate the entire surplus from
consumers and content providers. Hence, our results might not be robust to extensive use of
price discrimination and two-part tariffs by the platform. We believe, however, that our results
will still hold if some surplus is left to consumers and content providers. Nevertheless, our
focus has been on the two-sided nature of the market and we believe it to be important for
future studies to account for this. A one-sided analysis of two-sided markets may easily lead to
incorrect conclusions, as Wright (2004), among others, also have pointed out in other settings.
Appendix
A Proof of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Startingwithnetworkneutrality, considertheimpactofremovingnetworkneutralityregulation.
Prices and quantities. The difference in equilibrium price to consumers and fee to content
providers as we go away from network neutrality to monopolistic two-sided pricing is




Ds = sM  sNN = sM =
(a b)f(v c)
4ft  (a+b)2 > 0; (35)

















Equation (37) is negative for 2ft  a(a+b) > 0, which holds under Assumption 1.
Proﬁts, consumer surplus and content provider surplus. The equilibrium proﬁts of the
platform are higher when it is unconstrained:





) > 0: (38)





































(4ft  (a+b)2)2(ft  ab)2 > 0 (44)



































The sign is determined by the numerator, which is negative if 2ft  a(a+b) > 0.
Total surplus. We now calculate the change in total surplus that occurs when network




21and under network neutrality regulation
TSNN =
f(v c)2(a2 2ab+3ft)
8(ft  ab)2 : (48)
The change in total surplus is then










Our objective is to ﬁnd parameter values such that the removal of network neutrality regulations
reduces total surplus i.e., values such that the sign of equation (49) is negative.
















The sign of this expression is determined by the numerator. Expanding the numerator and
collecting terms in ft we get
(b a)
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Since we have assumed that a=b > 1, the sign of the above expression is negative provided that
ft is large enough and that a 5b is negative, that is, if a=b < 5.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Startingwithnetworkneutrality, considertheimpactofremovingnetworkneutralityregulation.
Since the market is covered in both regimes, consumer participation does not change. The
differences in equilibrium prices to consumers and fees to content providers are
Dp1 = pD
1   pDNN
















22and the difference in content provider participation is
Dncp1 = nD
cp1 nDNN


























Total welfare is reduced when the network neutrality regulation is removed since




A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove this Proposition, we ﬁrst obtain expressions for the number of active consumers and
content providers as functions of all four prices. These are
nc1 =













 2fs2t2+2a2b(2p2 t +2dt  2v)+at(b(s1+3s2)+ f(p1 3p2+t  2dt +2v))
4a2b2 6abft +2f2t2 :
(63)
























Total surplus is deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus, platform proﬁts and content provider
proﬁts.
We ﬁrst solve for equilibrium prices and fees in the unrestricted duopoly equilibrium. Plat-
form k choose prices and fees to maximize
Pk(p1;p2;s1;s2) = (pk c)nck(p1;p2;s1;s2)+skncpk(p1;p2;s1;s2) (66)




ab(8b2c+ ft( 22c 9t +18dt  18v))+









Under network neutrality regulation (s1 = s2 = 0), equilibrium subscription prices are obtained
by each platform setting the price to maximize
Pk(p1;p2;0;0) = (pk c)nck(p1;p2;0;0) (69)





















24To satisfy the second-order conditions, we need to impose ft  2ab > 0 and 4ab(a+b)2  
3(a2+6ab+b2)ft+8f2t2 > 0; that is, that the heterogeneity parameters are sufﬁciently large.
We now compare the unconstrained duopoly and the market equilibrium under network
neutrality. The differences in equilibrium prices to consumers and to content providers are
Dp1 = pD
1   pDNN
1 = Dp2 = pD
2   pDNN
2 < 0; (71)
Ds1 = sD
1  sDNN
1 = Ds2 = sD
2  sDNN
2 > 0 (72)
The differences in consumer and content provider participation are
Dnc1 = nD
c1 nDNN
c1 = Dnc2 = nD
c2 nDNN
c2 > 0; (73)
Dncp1 = nD
cp1 nDNN
cp1 = Dncp2 = nD
cp2 nDNN
cp2 < 0: (74)
The differences in consumer surplus, platform proﬁts and content provider proﬁts are
DCS =CSD CSDNN > 0; (75)
DP1 = PD
1  PDNN
1 = DP2 = PD
2  PDNN
2 > 0; (76)
DPcp = PD
cp PDNN
cp < 0: (77)
DTS = TSD TSDNN < 0: (78)
Total welfare is reduced when network neutrality regulation is removed if 3a 23b < 0 and
differentiation parameters f and t are sufﬁciently large so that 8a2b(3a4 +18a3b+18a2b2 +
54ab3+11b4)ft+(39a3 31a2b+491ab2+21b3)f3t3+5(3a 23b)f4t4 <16a3b2(a+b)2(a2+
ab+2b2)+a(9a4+133a3b+48a2b2+730ab3+76b4)f2t2.
B Second Best Outcome in the Monopoly Model
In this appendix, we discuss the second best outcome, when the regulator of the ISP monopolist
chooses p and s to maximize total surplus subject to the constraint that the platform’s proﬁts
are some positive amount P :
TS(p;s) s:t: P(p;s) = P (79)
25Our objective is to discuss under what conditions we could expect the fee to content providers
to be negative in this case.
We set up the Lagrangian as follows:
L = TS(p;s)+l (P(p;s) P); (80)
Given concavity of TS(p;s) and P(p;s) in p and s, L is concave in p and s for non-negative




a2(b(1+l)s+ f (p v))+ ft(cf (1+l)  f p 2flp bls+ flv)
+a(b2(1+l)s  flst  bf(1+l)(c 2p+v))
(ft  ab)







b2s  f (1+2l)st +bf (c+cl  lp v)

+a2b(1+l)(p v)
+a( b2(1+l)(c  p)+2b(1+l)st + flt( p+v))
(ft  ab)
2 = 0: (82)
Solving the system of these two equations, we can obtain explicit expressions of price to






































29In section 2.6, we showed that TS(p;s) is concave under Assumption 1 and in section 2.4 we showed that
p(p;s) is concave under Assumption 1.














3 > 0: (87)
When the proﬁt constraint is not binding, i.e., when l = 0, it is socially optimal to charge a
negative fee to the content side: s(0) =  bf(v c)=(ft  (a+b)
2) < 0 provided that ft >
(a+b)
2, which holds under Assumption 1. It is also optimal to charge a price below marginal
cost to consumers.
As we increase l away from zero, the constraint starts binding, and the proﬁts accrued
to the ISP increase. The numerator of s(l) is negative if and only if l < b
a b for a > b The
denominator is positive as long as ft > (a+b)
2, which holds under Assumption 1, and l > 0
Hence, it follows that given ft > (a+b)
2 and a > b, s(l) is negative for 0 6 l < b
a b and
positive for larger l, l > b
a b. Since ISP proﬁts are increasing in l, we have shown that the
planner’s constrained maximization problem results in a negative fee s when there is sufﬁcient
differentiation and proﬁts to be realized are P < ˆ P = P( b
a b) > 0. 30
When the regulator maximizes total surplus subject to a zero proﬁt constraint of the ISP, we
can show that he or she will choose an above cost price for the users and a below cost fee for
the content providers. To see this, consider P(l) for l in (0; b





> 0, and P(l) is continuous in l.32 Therefore there exist a l in (0; b
a b) so that
P(l) = 0. But for all in (0; b
a b) it holds that s(l) < 0. It follows that the regulator will
choose a negative fee to content providers to achieve a zero proﬁt for the ISP. Since the achieved
proﬁt is zero while fee s is negative, the regulator must impose an above cost price to users.33.
In summary, to maximize total surplus while requiring zero proﬁts for the ISP, the regulator
will choose an above cost price to users and a below cost fee to applications, s < 0 < p c, if
ft is sufﬁciently large.
Naturally, for the planner to implement the socially optimal price balance he or she would
be required to have detailed information about the state of the world. Network neutrality reg-
ulation (setting s = 0) is a much simpler form of regulation which does not require extensive
information on the state of the world.







2 > 0 if ft > a3=b.




32For the denominator of P(l) not to be zero it is sufﬁcient to have (1+2l)
2 > (1+l)
2 which is true for all
positive l.
33It is also easy to show explicitly that p(l) c > 0 Indeed the price to cost margin for consumers is negative





(a+b)(ft a2) > 0 for ft > a3=b and ft > a2, where




> 0 and the latter follows from ft > (a+b)
2.
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